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Dr Alderdice then turned to the general question of the social and psychological characterization of the terrorist. He began by indicating that although maladaptive resolution of psychic confl ict might be correlated with terrorism, it was not its invariable companion, and mentioned that neither unreasonable hatred, neurotic fear, nor a history of humiliation were suffi cient motivational conditions to join a terrorist organization or to stimulate terrorist action. He noted that some terrorists belonged to a tradition of violent struggle that had captured their admiration of, and prompted their identifi cation with, those they regarded as heroes of a noble political cause whose goals could only be achieved by violent means. In cases where family or friends were killed, joining a paramilitary organization served to satisfy revenge and protective motives. On the other hand, he pointed to a group of so-called “Cease fi re” soldiers, “johnnycome- lately’s” who opportunistically joined terrorist groups to satisfy economic motives through organized practices of “extortion, racketeering, [and the sale of] drugs.” Benefi ting from organized crime not only put these terrorists at odds with those whose primary interest was promoting a political agenda through violence but underscored motivational, personality, and socio-economic variations among terrorists. He summarized these differences by saying that whilst there was neither a unique terrorist personality type nor background associated with terrorism, systematic variations in terrorist tactics could be understood as developmental stages in the terrorist campaign. To substantiate this idea, he identifi ed changes in the implementation of political goals of the combatants in Northern Ireland during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The riots, bombings of buildings and large numbers of fatal shootings during the 1970s gave way to hunger strikes, targeted assassinations, and car bombings, and the use of electoral means to gain control of the communities in the 1980s. Tactics changed again during the 1990s by expanding the concept of a legitimate target to include, among other things, bombing the British mainland and, once the Belfast Agreement was negotiated, shifting the object of violent attacks from security forces to members of their own communities to assert their political control. In the case of the Northern Irish confl ict, these tactical changes refl ected a developmental process that saw periods of breakdown interspersed with movement toward peaceful resolution. During the peace negotiations themselves, an alternation in terrorist attitudes and behavior became apparent: as advances toward peace were achieved, they “met resistance . . . with obvious secondary gain.” Alderdice recognized certain “simple resonances” between breakdowns in the social process of peace negotiations and malfunctions observed by psychiatrists in the mental health of individuals. The question that captured his interest here was whether these apparent similarities could be understood psychologically, and if so, with which of several possible models. While recognizing that social inequality was a source of misery, Alderdice maintained that terrorism was more likely to emerge from societies rising up from poverty as he argued against the claim he believed characterized “political theories of the left,” namely, that poverty accounted for terrorism. To dispatch class analyses which identify 280 In Focus Int. J. Appl. Psychoanal. Studies 4: 277–285 (2007) Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd DOI: 10.1002/aps economic deprivation as the source of terrorism, Alderdice reminded the audience that Osama bin Laden, hardly a pauper, had profound experiences of humiliation and disrespect similar to those of Alderdice’s (earlier described) Northern Irish patient. Such experiences, he continued, play a prominent behind-the-scenes role in the development and actualization of terrorist inclinations. Terrorism generally does not assume a prominent role as a political strategy, especially in post-colonial societies, until the economic conditions begin to improve. It is precisely then, he contends, that “things became vulnerable to breakdown” and terrorism became a viable political option. Lord Alderdice views the terrorism theories and contravention strategies stemming from the political right, from those who claim ethical neutrality in foreign policy, and from self-regarding anti-doctrinaire utilitarians who construe their policies to be in the “best interests” of those they represent, as prepsychoanalytic forms of false consciousness. He recognizes the despotic inanity of treating serious social confl ict in a “simple behavioral fashion” dispensing economic and political rewards for desired behavior and punishing the undesirable with negative sanctions or war, and regards the “US approach to the Middle East” as well as the Israeli government’s “attacks on Palestinians” as examples of this misguided approach to social and cultural confl ict remediation. He argued that people who live under social conditions that regularly produce intense negative affects they cannot alleviate through positive, affi rmative social action do not always recognize, let alone act realistically, in terms of their “best interests.” Following Freud, he distinguished between grief and depression, and warned that a diagnosis of either presupposes knowledge of the social-cultural conditions in which they occur. Believing that a psychoanalytic understanding of individual development, intrapsychic confl ict, and mental illness could be usefully applied to social processes characterized by high degrees of intra- and inter-communal confl ict, profound violence, and hatred, Alderdice outlined six psychoanalytic principles that orient individual treatment to see how they might aid our understanding of the social and cultural phenomenon of terrorism. The principles, which Alderdice used to organize much of the remainder of his presentation, included: understanding the subject’s particular meaning-making activity; knowing how the past affects the present; recognizing the impact of regression on the emergence of primitive states; discerning the importance of temporal factors in the development of mental illness; appreciating the role of unrequited humiliation and shame in subsequent violence; and perceiving the operation and signifi cance of resistances to health. How then, Alderdice wondered, do these principles serve as a framework for improving our interpretation of terrorism? He answered by saying that grasping the mental state of those having been subjected to terrorizing tactics and appreciating their narrative constructions about what was happening, and why, illustrated the principle of becoming aware of how the terrorizing violence was experienced. Terrorism’s purpose, he seemed to be saying, may or may not be In Focus 281 Int. J. Appl. Psychoanal. Studies 4: 277–285 (2007) Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd DOI: 10.1002/aps confusing to the surviving victim traumatized by its effects but the terrorist usually has a clear understanding of the perceived necessity of this particular form of violence. In other words, the subjective states of both must be understood psychoanalytically to develop a reasonable intervention strategy. The psychoanalytic principle that underscores the importance of knowing how the past infi ltrates the present is background knowledge for the psychoanalytic clinician treating an individual patient; however, to apply this foundational idea to terrorism required Alderdice to make an additional assumption in which knowledge of the psychology of the individual is the basis for inferring similar processes about the psychology of the group. In this way, Alderdice conceptualized terrorist violence as an advanced stage of a lengthy social deterioration process whose meaning for its perpetrators only becomes accessible through knowledge of their collective past. For members of a terrorist network, terrorism is a justifi able means of social violence whose end is to right a social and cultural wrong. It addresses a communal injury regardless of when the perceived violation occurred. Lord Alderdice put the matter well, saying, “If the past in personal terms casts a cloud over decades of individual life, in communal terms the time frame may be centuries.” He then gave illustrations of two more psychoanalytic principles that he found useful in conceptualizing what drives people to terrorism. First, he talked about how members of societies caught up in protracted social confl ict frequently experienced powerful feelings that could overwhelm reason, thus exemplifying how the regression of higher mental functions gives way to primitive mental states. Adding that it was diffi cult for well-meaning British politicians to see that the suicidal destruction of others was not conduct easily put to one side but something driven by commanding mental states which obviated constructive thought and action, Alderdice concluded that powerful affects dominate terrorist behavior. He then elaborated his contention that disrespect and humiliation, and the wish to avenge these injustices, were the “most signifi cant” contributors to subsequent terrorist violence. He added that an entire community punished and tormented in this way could be driven to violence as harsh as that which it had experienced it. Alderdice began the last segment of his presentation by stating that the central organizing concept of US and British foreign and military policy since September of 2001, the “War on Terrorism” was “hard to understand” and was probably “counterproductive” since terrorism was neither a “structure, an organization [n]or even a belief system.” Rather, he continued, terrorism is a tactic, a set of actions implementing a strategic goal. The tactic, the premeditated use of violence, implements the strategy of creating a “climate of fear.” Terrorists maintain a clear distinction between the intended targets, those held to be responsible for the communal agony, and the immediate victims of their violence. Terrorism is a provocative act in which the terrorist, unlike the ordinary criminal, claims responsibility for the violence instead of avoiding it. The 282 In Focus Int. J. Appl. Psychoanal. Studies 4: 277–285 (2007) Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd DOI: 10.1002/aps terrorist is satisfi ed if the goal of retaliating against the real target is achieved. As long as the terrorist campaign is successful, the terrorist’s victory is not diminished by his or her personal sacrifi ce. In fact, given its own perceived weakness relative to that of the intended target, the terrorist organization sometimes seeks to aggravate, even to provoke harsher retaliation to gain the moral high ground. After distinguishing between state terror, in which a government tortures, disappears, and murders its own citizens to maintain its power and terrorism, the use of violence to engender “radical change in the polity,” Alderdice noted an important similarity in the beliefs of terrorists and those who combat them. Both, he observed, think that getting rid of the evil-other is good and that dying for the cause reinforces their own convictions about the other’s wickedness. In this regard, Alderdice was reminded of the diffi culty, often seen in psychotic patients, of effectively intervening when primitive modes of primary process thought dominate. Whether or not the manifest ideation is theological or political, dismissing the terrorists as madmen misses the possibility of understanding them and of effectively intervening. The issue of how to use psychoanalytic insight to help restore methods of rational confl ict resolution and contain further social violence took up the remainder of Lord Alderdice’s paper. He reminded the audience that coping during an outbreak of terrorism can take different forms, ranging from measures that distort but preserve some degree of social functioning to a “profound dissolution of society into chaotic violence.” In the latter case, rational discourse is all but impossible and the best that can be hoped for is to contain further selfand retaliatory damage. After analogizing the healing process of clinical psychoanalytic intervention, in which violent thought is contained through its exploration, to that of social interventions with a similar aim, Lord Alderdice emphasized the importance of creating an intervention strategy that maintained continuity of care, boundary setting, inclusion of all parties, and communication when seeking “help [for] a community in chronic turmoil.” In the same vein, he cautioned against believing that appeals to communal rationality or coming up with the “right plan” would facilitate adaptive confl ict resolution. Finally, Lord Alderdice reminded the audience of the challenges of facilitating and implementing social change. Referring to his extensive experience in observing and working to fi nd psychoanalytically informed solutions for the chronic violence in Northern Ireland, he noted that after 11 years of peace negotiations, conducted during his tenure as head of a political party and six more as the Speaker of the Northern Irish Assembly, the manifestations of violence changed, but the violence itself did not end. This sobering idea underscored the importance of recognizing and working within the realistic social, political, cultural, economic, and psychological limits of all parties involved in finding viable alternatives to terrorist violence. Realistic intervention goals clearly require a long term perspective characterized by “patience, understanding, and respect and . . . tough, resolute . . . creative adherence to the process . . . at the heart of all our work on or off the couch.” In Focus 283 Int. J. Appl. Psychoanal. Studies 4: 277–285 (2007) Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd DOI: 10.1002/aps Discussion of Dr Alderdice’s presentation Nadia Ramzy began the discussion of John Alderdice’s warmly and enthusiastically received presentation. Then the audience joined the question and answer session. In reporting about the exchange with the audience, I have only included essential ideas communicated by the various speakers. Unless otherwise indicated, the form of the report is formatted as an interview and intended to refl ect the fl ow of the exchange between the participants.